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Jo Laycock 
 
BEYOND NATIONAL NARRATIVES? CENTENARY HISTORIES, THE FIRST WORLD 




In April 2015 the centenary of the Armenian Genocide was commemorated. Just like the First 
World War centenary, this anniversary has provoked a flurry of academic and public interest in 
what remains a highly contested history. This article assesses the state of the current historiog-
raphy on the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. It focuses on the possibilities for moving beyond the 
national narratives which continue to dominate the field, in particular through connecting the case 
of the Armenian Genocide to what has been termed a ‘transnational turn’ in the writing of the his-
tory of the First World War. 
 
Introduction 
Referring to the fate of the Ottoman Armenians as a ‘forgotten genocide’ no longer feels appropri-
ate. Whilst the Turkish government continues to pursue an active policy of denial, international 
public, political and academic awareness of the decimation of the Armenian population of the Ot-
toman Empire has increased significantly. This has been particularly evident in 2015, as the cen-
tenary of the Armenian Genocide has been commemorated in Yerevan (the capital of the Republic 
of Armenia) and Istanbul, as well as in Armenian diaspora communities around the globe.1 The 
commemorations have attracted unprecedented international media attention, due in no small part to 
the interventions of two rather different figures. The significance of Pope Francis’ statement has 
been widely recognised.2 Kim Kardashian’s visit to the Republic of Armenia has, on the contrary, 
been easy to trivialise, but the role of celebrity culture and social media in generating public interest 
in this contested issue is a reality surely deserving of further analysis.3 
 
Commemorations have been accompanied by a wave of academic conferences and landmark publi-
cations. Ronald Grigor Suny’s They Can Live in the Desert and Nowhere Else, for example, provid-
ed insightful new syntheses of the causes of the Genocide. Others, notably Fatma Müge Göçek’s 
Denial of Violence and Thomas de Waal’s Great Catastrophe, have addressed aftermaths, remem-
brance and denial.4 These publications build upon groundbreaking research conducted in Turkish 
and international archives by historians including Raymond Kevorkian, Taner Akçam and Uğur 
                                                 
1
 The Genocide is usually commemorated on 24th April, the date of the arrest and deportation of leading members of 
the Istanbul Armenian community. On the Istanbul commemorations and diaspora participation see the Project 2015 
website (accessed 2 September 2015) http://www.armenianproject2015.org; INTERNET. 
2
 ‘Full Text: Pope Francis’ message to the Armenians’. Catholic Herald, Monday 13th April 2015 (accessed 5 June 
2015)  http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2015/04/13/full-text-pope-franciss-message-to-armenians/; INTERNET. 
3
 On 25th April The Guardian reported on Kardashian’s call for President Obama to use the word ‘genocide’. Jana 
Kasperkevic, ‘Kim Kardashian Urges Obama to Call Armenian Massacre a Genocide’ The Guardian (accessed 5 June 
2015) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/25/kim-kardashian-obama-armenian-genocide; INTERNET. 
4
 Suny, They can Live in the Desert, Göçek, Denial of Violence and De Waal, Great Catastrophe. Other publications in 
the centenary year are Vicken Cheterian’s Open Wounds and Robertson, An Inconvenient Genocide. 
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Ümit Üngör.5 Their research has demonstrated how the deportations and massacres were centrally 
orchestrated and has shed light on the local specificities and the wider international contexts which 
shaped the fate of the Armenians. Akçam and Üngör in particular have situated the Genocide in a 
spectrum of ‘demographic engineering’ in the late-Ottoman Empire in which Kurds, Greeks, Assyr-
ians and other minorities, as well as Armenians, were targeted. As a whole, this scholarship demon-
strates two trends in the historiography of the Genocide over the last fifteen years. Firstly, a shift 
away from finding ‘evidence' that the treatment of the Armenians constituted Genocide under the 
1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide to more nuanced, 
theoretically informed approaches to cause, experience and aftermath.6 Secondly, a gradual destabi-
lising of the two distinct Armenian and Turkish narratives which dominate the historiography and 
which, at first sight, ‘appear to defy reconciliation’.7  
 
In Denial of Violence Göçek demonstrates how a ‘mythicised’ national historiography was con-
structed in the Turkish Republic which ‘valorised Turkish achievements, whitewashed the crimes, 
blamed especially the minorities and the west for all past defeats and silenced the violence commit-
ted against others.’8 Denial of genocidal violence against the Armenians was a key feature of this 
narrative of national history. The Armenian counter-narrative has been shaped by this context of 
denial which, according to Sebouh Aslanian, has ‘created a hypertrophied or bloated historical 
memory for most Armenians’.9 An essentialist and defensive national narrative of national history 
has emerged which focuses on suffering and survival. This narrative has been little integrated into 
broader historiographies as the ‘unresolved trauma of the genocide’ has encouraged parochial insu-
lation from the larger world.’ Aslanian’s own response to this predicament has been a call for a new 
approach to the Armenian past which ‘is interactive and framed within the larger context of 
world/global history’.10  
 
This article reflects on recent trends in the historiography in the light of the call for a more ‘interac-
tive’ history. It considers the insights that a shift beyond dominant national frameworks has already 
offered and the pitfalls and possibilities of further developing transnational approaches to this con-
tested past.11 Transnational history, Patricia Clavin suggests, is ‘more about performance than stric-
ture. It does not have a unique methodology, but is motivated by the desire to highlight the im-
portance of connections and transfers across boundaries at the sub- or supra-state level, the compo-
                                                 
5
 Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity. Kevorkian’s The Armenian Genocide provides a detailed region 
by region narrative, Uğur Ümit Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey, on the Diyabekir region. See also the essays 
collected in A Question of Genocide, for example Arkun, ‘Zeytun and the Commencement of the Armenian Genocide’. 
Michael Reynolds claims that Akçam’s research alone ‘dynamites the claim that the Ottoman Archives exculpate the 
Ottoman state.’Reynolds, ‘Review Forum’,  473. 
6
 This shift is explained in Suny, ‘Truth in Telling’. 
7
 Suny, ‘Truth in Telling’, 931. 
8
 Göçek, ‘Reading Genocide’. 42. In Denial of Violence Göçek connects denial of the ‘foundational violence’ of the 
Armenian Genocide to continuing violence against minority and opposition groups within the Turkish Republic. 
9
 Aslanian, ‘The Marble of Armenian History’,133-4. 
10
 Aslanian, ‘The Marble of Armenian History’, 133-4, 130. World/global history is not the same as transnational histo-
ry but shares the desire to go beyond the nation state as the primary or only unit of analysis and consider broader pro-
cesses of exchange and circulation and the importance of networks and border crossings of various kinds. 
11
 A shift is evident in the approach of the UCLA Armenian History centenary conference entitled, ’Genocide and 
Global History: A Conference on the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide’ organised by the Richard 
Hovannisian Endowed Chair in Modern Armenian History at UCLA, April 2015 
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sition of categories, and the character and exploitation of boundaries.’12 A transnational approach 
does not imply disregarding the nation state as a category of analysis, but it does demand paying 
attention to interactions between local, nation and international events and processes. Nor does it 
preclude paying attention to conflict. Whilst transnational approaches may have frequently empha-
sised ‘movements, flows and circulations’ in a manner suggestive of growing co-operation or inte-
gration, the case of Armenia demonstrates that transnational approaches also offer insights into the 
causes and consequences of violence and displacement.13 
 
Transnational encounters, practices and approaches have shaped innovative academic engagements 
with the Genocide and its aftermaths in recent years. Cross-border encounters and projects have 
brought together scholars, artists, journalists and activists and shifts in the public and intellectual 
climate within Turkey have allowed groundbreaking Turkish scholars drawing on hitherto neglected 
archival sources to challenge the official line.14 This climate, coupled with the fall of the Soviet Un-
ion has also encouraged dialogue between scholars from Turkey, the diaspora and the Armenian 
Republic.15 The ‘subversive friendships’ forged through these processes have created space for new 
analyses of both causes and consequences of violence against the Armenians and, more broadly, an 
opportunity to re-think relations between Armenians, Turks and the other peoples of the former Ot-
toman Empire past and present.16 
 
The aim of this article is not to provide a comprehensive review of the causes and implementation 
of the Genocide. Rather, this article looks outwards, focusing on the ways in which interpretations 
of the Armenian Genocide have been developed or challenged by methods and approaches which 
connect the treatment of the Armenians to transnational contexts and processes.17 I focus particular-
ly on the place of the Armenian Genocide in the history of the First World War. Jay Winter has 
suggested that the current ‘generation’ of scholarship on the First World War is characterised by its 
transnational approach.18 However, the fate of the Armenians still remains largely isolated from the 
historiography of this conflict. Integrating theses historiographies is not simply a matter of consid-
ering the First World War as a cause of the Genocide, it also means considering how the fate of the 
                                                 
12
 Patricia Clavin, ‘Time, Manner, Place’,625. Some central debates are addressed here: C. A. Bayley, Sven Beckert, 
Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyer, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’. 
13
 Hofmayer, ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, 1444. 
14
  On changing Turkish society and politics see Öktem, Angry Nation. Speaking To One Another is one such dialogue 
project. Some outcomes are available on the project website (accessed 11 July 2015)  http://www.dvv-
international.ge/region/speaking-to-one-another.html; INTERNET.  
15
 The Workshop in Armenian Turkish Studies (WATS ) project was initiated by Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge 
Göçek and Jirair Libaridian. 
16
 I borrow the term ‘Subversive friendships’ from Kerem Öktem and Sossie Kasbarian. Both were involved in the 
London based Project of Armenian and Turkish Studies. Öktem and Kasbarian, ’Subversive friendships’,121 - 146. 
17
 My focus in this article is largely on the anglophone scholarship. Most of the key contemporary debates have devel-
oped in diaspora and international scholarship rather than from within the Soviet/post-Soviet Republic of Armenia. On 
the divergence between historical scholarship in the Armenian Republic and the diaspora and conflicts over the concep-
tualisation of national identity, see Sebouh Aslanian, ‘The Treason of the Intellectuals’. In the Republic of Armenia the 
centenary has lead to several commemorative publications but few new research based monographs/articles or synthe-
ses. Important recent contributions to the scholarship from the Republic of Armenia include a collection of eyewitness 
testimonies by Verjine Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide and Harutyun Marutyan, Iconography of Armenian Identity, 
which addresses the neglected subject of how the memory of the genocide has shaped ongoing conflicts between Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan.  
18
 Jay M. Winter ‘General Introduction’ 6. 
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Armenians challenges and deepens current understandings of the nature, conduct and consequences 
of this conflict. At first sight it seems that the centenaries of the First World War and the Armenian 
Genocide provide an ideal platform for the development of such integrated histories. I consider to 
what extent this has been the case. 
 
National Narratives 
Whilst the Turkish Republic established in 1923 endures, the post-war Armenian attempt at national 
independence proved short-lived. In May 1918, in the vacuum left by revolution and the collapse of 
the Tsarist Empire an Armenian Republic was created in the South Caucasus. By December 1920, 
facing an advance by Turkish nationalists, the Republic’s leaders had accepted Sovietisation as the 
‘lesser of two evils’. This new Soviet Republic provided a home for around 300,000 Armenian ref-
ugees as well as the established local Armenian population.19 Thousands of other surviving Arme-
nians meanwhile made new lives in diaspora communities in the Middle East and Eastern Mediter-
ranean. Others embarked on more prolonged trajectories of displacement and resettlement. Smaller 
numbers survived in the Turkish Republic where some, who had converted to Islam during  and af-
ter the Genocide, forcibly or otherwise, concealed their Armenian identities.20  
 
These circumstances of dispersion, insecurity and hardship meant that in the inter-war period no 
single, state-sponsored Armenian account of the Genocide emerged. Aside from the publication of 
several key memoirs and accounts, remembrance occurred privately, in family contexts. Whilst the 
inter-war years were a critical period of identity formation in diaspora communities, perhaps be-
cause of this relative paucity of public, centralised commemorative practices there has been little 
research addressing the specific ways in which the memory of the Genocide was shaped or shared 
in different communities during these years.21 In the case of the Soviet Republic of Armenia, in 
contrast, it has become commonplace to assume that memories of Genocide were actively sup-
pressed by the authorities. The reality was rather more complex. Soviet nationalities policies fluctu-
ated over time but frequently meant the (re)construction rather than suppression of national catego-
ries and identities. This entailed both the construction of official, state-sanctioned national histories 
and attempts to shape collective memory to suit Soviet political and social ends.22 Thus to assume 
Genocide was ‘forgotten’ in Soviet Armenia is too simplistic. The fiftieth anniversary of the Geno-
cide was met with unprecedented protests that led to the construction of a memorial to the Genocide 
                                                 
19
 Literature on Soviet Armenia remains limited. Matossian, Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia  is a classic text. 
Razmik Panossian connects the histories of the Soviet Republic and the diaspora in The Armenians. 
20
 The publication of Fethiye  Çetin’s My Grandmother awakened public curiosity and scholarly interest in these ‘hid-
den Armenians’.  
21
 On diaspora communities during this period see, for example, Mandel, In the Aftermath of Genocide and Migliorino, 
(Re)Constructing Armenia. Memorial practices such as the production of memory books recalling life in the Ottoman 
Empire before the genocide did occur. See Mihran Minassian, ‘Tracking down the past: The memory book 
(houshamadyan) genre - A Preliminary Bibliography’ (accessed 15 July 2015) available from 
http://www.houshamadyan.org/en/themes/bibliography.html; INTERNET. Oral histories of the genocide have ad-
dressed these issues to some extent, for example, Donald E. Miller & Lorna Touryan Miller, Survivors. A few scholars 
have addressed the specific structures and practices through which the genocide has been remembered. See for example 
Nefissa Naguib’s analysis of family photographs and memory ‘Storytelling’.  
22
 Suny examines nationalities policy in Soviet Armenia in Looking Toward Ararat. 
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in Yerevan. These events suggested that the Soviet state’s policies on the Genocide were not set in 
stone nor all-encompassing.23 
 
Whilst the treatment of the Armenians was well known to the Allies during the First World War, 
following the Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1924 it rapidly 
faded from political and public consciousness. International ‘forgetting’ was driven by geopolitical 
imperatives, initially the desire to maintain good relations with the Turkish Republic and later Cold 
War politics.24 This international process of forgetting thus worked in tandem with the Turkish nar-
rative. In the aftermath of the Second World War Raphael Lemkin’s articulation of the legal catego-
ry of genocide, as enshrined in the 1948 Convention, provided a new vocabulary through which 
Armenians could articulate their experiences and seek justice or redress. It transformed the way in 
which Armenian communities engaged with their own pasts.25 Talar Chahinian explains that, ‘Ar-
menians of the diaspora, now out of refugee camps and economically more stable, see the interna-
tional response to the Holocaust and recognise their own right to appeal to international law. This 
sense of awakened political consciousness becomes a unified, transnational collective voice in 
1965, when Armenian communities around the world commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 
genocide. Subsequently, the call for recognition, demanded from both the communities’ host coun-
tries and from Turkey, becomes the marker of Armenian identity in the diaspora.’26 These shifts had 
a more troubling side. Between 1973 and 1985 two Armenian terrorist groups ASALA (Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and the JCOAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian 
Genocide) assassinated Turkish diplomats and bombed public spaces.27  Their attacks polarised 
diaspora communities and fostered the development of a more aggressive denial narrative in 
Turkey.28 
 
Against this turbulent backdrop Armenian scholars pioneered the academic study of the Genocide.29 
The climate of intensified denial and increasing claims for recognition shaped this early research. 
Whilst important steps forward were made, too much of this work was predicated on the assump-
tion of endemic conflict between Armenians and Turks or shaped by essentialist notions of Turkish 
(or Islamic) barbarity and Armenian passivity and victimhood.30 The tendency to treat the writing of 
Armenian history as the recovery and preservation of an endangered national identity and culture 
also resulted in a dearth of critical, theoretically informed approaches. Complexities were masked 
as these narratives tended to present Armenians simply as victims rather than as agents in their own 
                                                 
23
 On 1965 and the Armenian protests: Maike Lehman, ‘Apricot Socialism’. Lehmann argues that the building of the 
genocide memorial was not a matter of opposition to socialism but was part of a ‘hybrid continuum between the nation-
al and socialist’, 29. 
24
 See Bloxham, Great Game of Genocide, part III From Response to Recognition. 
25
 Contemporary observers of course did not have the term ‘genocide’ at their disposal, but they referred to the massa-
cres and deportations as an attempt to ‘exterminate’ a nation. Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 115-116. 
26
 Talar Chahinian. ‘The Paris Attempt’, 12. 
27
 These episodes are not well integrated into the historiography but see the chapter ‘Assailing Turkey’ in de Waal’s 
Great Catastrophe. 
28
 Göçek, Denial of Violence, 452. 
29
 Richard Hovannisian was at the forefront of this research. Yves Ternon, Les Armeniens was the first major work by 
an international scholar. 
30
 For example Dadrian’s work posited an enduring conflict between Turks and Armenians, relying on orientalist ethnic 
and religious stereotypes. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide. Elements of his approach, especially his 
argument for a genocidal agenda stretching back into the nineteenth century has been widely critiqued. 
   6 
right.31 In response the Turkish state and a few international historians articulated more elaborate 
denial narratives.32 That Armenians had perished was not generally disputed. Rather, the numbers 
of Armenian deaths were minimised, or the massacres were said to be the result of a ‘civil war’ in 
which both Armenians and Turks perished. Alternatively, in what Robert Melson has termed the 
‘provocation thesis’, it was argued that disloyal Armenian nationalists who were likely to side with 
the Russians in the war posed a genuine threat to the Empire and the deportations were thus a ra-
tional and proportional defensive measure.33 Scholars outside this debate meanwhile tended not to 
engage with a subject which, if not unknown, appeared to be fraught with difficulties. Thus by the 
end of the twentieth century two polarised narratives had hardened, and there still appeared to be  
limited scope for moving beyond them. 
 
Beyond National Narratives: Comparisons to Contexts 
The centenary of the Genocide was formally commemorated in Armenia at the Genocide Memorial 
at Tsitsernakaberd, Yerevan on April 24 2015. In his address the President of Armenia connected 
the fate of the Armenians to genocides in Europe, Rwanda and Cambodia and to ongoing violence 
in the Middle East.34 The tendency to connect the fate of the Armenians to other episodes of mass 
killing in the twentieth century and to link remembrance and recognition to the prevention of further 
crimes of this nature came to the fore with the development of comparative genocide studies in the 
1990s. The rapid expansion of this field was borne out of a desire to understand the tragedies which 
had unfolded in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Comparative approaches also had earlier ori-
gins in analyses of the relationship between the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. Some 
groundbreaking research emerged from this approach.35 However, a preoccupation with measuring 
the Armenian case against the Holocaust sometimes detracted from the particularities of the Arme-
nian case, risked creating a deterministic narrative of the development of genocidal violence from 
the First to the Second World Wars and generated a disproportionate focus on the question of Ger-
man involvement. 
 
As comparisons broadened the case of Armenia was frequently included in comparative volumes as 
an illustration of an ‘early’ instance of modern genocide.36 Whilst such scholarship went some way 
to counter images of the Armenian genocide as a consequence of a unique path of national history 
or ancient enmities between Armenians and Turks, it posed problems of its own. The emphasis on 
                                                 
31
 Genocide and recognition at this time began to dominate many diaspora communities,  leading to articulations of 
Armenian identity which some found limiting. This is explored in Meline Toumani’s memoir There as and there was 
not. The backlash that Toumani’s approach provoked in some sectors of the Armenian press reflects the continued pow-
er of these kinds of nationalist discourses in Armenian communities. See for example Garen Yeghparian,‘Soul Search-
ing or Self-Serving’ Armenian Weekly, 18th December 2015  (accessed 16 July/2015) 
http://armenianweekly.com/2014/12/18/soul-searching-or-self-serving/; INTERNET 
32
 On denial and international scholars, Suny, ‘Truth in Telling’ esp., 932-935. The Middle Eastern Studies series pub-
lished by Utah University Press provided one forum for denialist accounts in the United States. 
33
 Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide. 
34
 ‘Statement by Serzh Sargsyan, the President of the Republic of Armenia’ 24 April 2015 (accessed 3 September 2015) 
available from the website of the President of Armenia, http://www.president.am/en/press-
release/item/2015/04/24/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-Genocide-April-24/; INTERNET 
35
 For example, Melson, Revolution and Genocide and contributions to Hans Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller, 
eds. Der Volkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah. 
36
 Important contributions to the comparative perspective included Weitz, A Century of Genocide, Gellately and 
Kiernan, eds. The Spectre of Genocide and Naimark, Fires of Hatred. 
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creating typologies and a ‘preoccupation with the definition and applicability of the term genocide’ 
ultimately limited its effectiveness.37 In particular, in emphasising patterns and templates this schol-
arship tended to de-historicise or de-contextualise particular cases. In the words of Mark Levene 
inadvertently or otherwise, it created the impression that ‘genocides occur in situations radically 
outside, or at least at the margins of normative existence.’38 In the Armenian case, this meant that 
finding the origins of features of later incidences of mass killing overrode considerations of histori-
cal context and contingency. 
 
More fruitful for the Armenian case has been interpretations which relate mass killing to tensions 
generated by the decline of empires and the rise of modern nation states. Levene, for example, has 
demonstrated how modern genocidal practices emerged in the regions where the ‘complex, plural, 
non-essentialist rimland society’ of the European continental empires came into contact with the 
emerging modernizing nation-state system of western Europe. His perspective is particularly salient 
to the Armenian case, bringing to the fore the importance of Armenia’s geographical location with-
out resorting to cliches regarding the ‘barbarism’ or inherent instability of Europe’s borderlands.39 
In general, historians of the Armenian Genocide now situate its causes within this framework of 
imperial collapse and the rise of nation states premised on ethnic homogeniety. There are a number 
of different inflections in the scholarship but virtually all acknowledge the centrality of entwined 
processes of ‘decline and modernisation’ in the late Ottoman Empire in determining the fate of the 
Armenians.40 
 
The image of the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire as the ‘sick man of Europe’ is well estab-
lished. The rise of nationalism amongst minority populations was central to the problems facing the 
Empire. By the end of the nineteenth century it had already lost significant territories in the Bal-
kans. In addition to the loss of land, revenue and prestige, territorial losses also had serious social 
consequences. For example, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the resettlement of 
Muslim refugees (muhacirs) from the Caucasus and the Balkans in Eastern Anatolia created pres-
sure on land and resources, increasing existing tensions between the Armenians, Kurds and other 
ethnic groups which populated these regions.41 The Ottoman state was not passive in the face of 
these problems. Rather it embarked on various processes of ‘defensive’ modernisation and reform. 
Reforms were partial and affected the minorities in an uneven manner. According to Bedross der 
Matossian their effects ranged ‘from changes in the dynamics of power within the communities, 
their relations toward the state, center-periphery relations and interethnic relations, to the metamor-
phosis of overlapping, vague identities.’42 
 
                                                 
37
 Bloxham and Moses, ‘Introduction’, 7. 
38
 Levene, The Crisis of Genocide Vol. 1, preface. 
39
 Levene, Crisis of Genocide, 99. 
40
 Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey, 25. 
41
  Longer-term patterns of deportation and resettlement is an emerging but still under-explored theme. See Chatty, Dis-
placement and Dispossession, chapters 3 and 4. 
42
 Bedross der Matossian, Shattered Dreams of Revolution, 21. 
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New scholarship on minorities in the late Ottoman Empire shown how these changes destabilised 
established social and ethnic relations, creating new sources of conflict.43  It has also however 
demonstrated the complexities of late-Ottoman social identities and the limitations of analyses 
based on assumptions of fixed ethnic difference and division. For example, in her analysis of the 
memoir of an Armenian shoemaker from Marash Nora Lessersohn argues that ‘We must exercise 
the patience to consider more than one lived reality and conceptualise lives lived in more than one 
register … a late Ottoman (Armenian) subject could feel both ownership and alienation, brother-
hood and fear.’44 The path from an imperial system which accommodated difference, which was 
predicated on inequality but  allowed for  inter-communal interaction and fluid identities, to an ex-
clusive vision of Turkish nationalism which excluded minorities, was complex and contested. The 
‘Hamidian’ massacres of the Armenians in the 1890s were not a first step on a predetermined path 
to Genocide but rather an attempt of the embattled Sultan to ‘maintain the old order’.45 Even after 
the Young Turk revolution and coming to power of the CUP in 1908 the dominance of exclusionary 
ethnic Turkish nationalist ideologies was by not means assured. The CUP incorporated a broad 
range of modernizing and reforming perspectives and a wide range of visions of the Empire’s future 
emerged.46 
 
The Balkan wars of 1912-13 transformed Ottoman attitudes to the Armenians.  According to Ungor 
their consequences were ‘nothing short of apocalyptic’.47 In this context Armenian nationalism, 
however limited its reach in reality, appeared more of a danger than ever.48 Whilst Balkan national-
isms had lead to the loss of the Empire’s peripheries, Armenian nationalism, it was thought, posed a 
threat to the Ottoman heartland, and thus to the very existence of the Empire. Suny has stressed that 
Ottoman fears of Armenian nationalism should be taken seriously if we are to understand the causes 
of the Genocide, arguing that from the nineteenth century a negative and fearful ‘affective disposi-
tion’ towards the Armenians began to develop. Following the catastrophic losses of the Balkan wars 
in 1912-13, as refugees arrived in Anatolia with accounts of violence perpetrated by Christians this 
was intensified, creating the conditions in which genocide became possible.49 
 
Nationalism has long been identified as a cause of the Genocide, but its significance has been inter-
preted in a number of different ways. Bernard Lewis’ argument that the fate of the Armenians as a 
result of a deadly competition between ‘two nations’ has been widely criticised, not least for over-
estimating the power of Armenian nationalist movements and underestimating the highly unequal 
context.50 Whilst the Genocide undoubtedly occurred in the context of the rise of the nation state, 
                                                 
43
 There is a substantial literature on the experience of different ethnic and social groups during this period, which goes 
beyond the scope of this article. See for example Matossian, Shattered Dreams of Revolution, Klein, The Margins of 
Empire, Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties. 
44
 Lessersohn.’“Provincial Cosmopolitanism” 
45
 Hovanissian, The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire’, 226. 
46
 On shifts within the CUP see, for example, Üngör, Making of Modern Turkey, 30-33. 
47
 Ungor, Making of Modern Turkey, 43. 
48
 On Armenian nationalism see, for example Dikran Kaligian, Armenian Organisation and Ideology. 
49
 Suny, They Can Live in the Desert. How this ‘affective disposition’ operated in particular local contexts, warrants 
further investigation. Many scholars have noted that several Young Turk leaders had origins in the former Ottoman 
territories in Greece and the Balkans. On atrocity and violence in the Balkan wars see Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, 
132-140. 
50
 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 356. 
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important questions remain regarding the role of nationalism in driving genocidal policies. Michael 
Reynolds has demonstrated that the destruction of the Armenians arose as much in a context of con-
flict between two imperial states, the Russian and Ottoman Empires as it did from a surge of na-
tionalist feeling: ‘interstate competition, and not nationalism, provides the key to understanding the 
course of history in the Ottoman-Russian borderlands in the early twentieth century.’51 Suny mean-
while makes a careful distinction between the desire to preserve or re-invigorate a struggling empire 
which conditioned the Young Turks’ genocidal policies and the post-war, Kemalist project of build-
ing a modern Turkish nation-state.52 
 
Üngör and Akcam meanwhile identify the Armenian Genocide as part of emerging practices of 
‘demographic engineering’ in the Ottoman Empire, practices that were informed by but not reduci-
ble to nationalist ideologies.53 These practices had its roots in the longstanding, if ad hoc, resettle-
ment policies of the Ottoman authorities. Akcam explains how, in the aftermath of the Balkan wars 
resettlement came to be managed in a more ‘systematic’ fashion geared towards the ethnic ‘homog-
enization’ of Anatolia.54 Armenians were not the only minority to be targeted. As Üngör demon-
strates, such processes continued to be a feature of the Turkish Republic, which would also subject 
the Kurds to deportation and violence.55 Emphasising this context connects the Ottoman treatment 
of the Armenians to the rise of specifically modern forms of ‘population politics’. It identifies the 
targeting of minorities not as a product of Ottoman ‘backwardness’ but a function of the transna-
tional emergence of states that viewed the re-shaping of they populations to conform to particular 
ideals as a desirable or necessary process.56  
 
Alongside these reconsideration of the internal dynamics of late Ottoman politics and society new 
scholarship on the fate of the Armenians has also emphasised the importance of external factors. 
Donald Bloxham’s Great Game of Genocide demonstrated how internal developments in the Otto-
man Empire intersected with the geopolitics of the Eastern Question and an international context of 
competition between modernising empires. By the 1890s the Armenians had effectively become 
pawns in the geopolitical political ‘games’ of the Eastern Question. Acknowledging the ways that 
‘great power’ politics contributed to the fate of the Armenians has sometimes resulted in a reductive 
narrative which simple blames the powers for ‘abandoning’ the Armenians to their fate. However, 
more recent analyses have demonstrated in a nuanced manner how transnational advocacy net-
works, however well-meaning, inadvertently increased Ottoman hostility to the Armenians and fue-
lled the fires of Armenian nationalists without providing them with any concrete support. Under-
standing these processes requires going beyond the realm of ‘high politics’. The Armenian question 
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drew in a variety non-state actors who sought to advocate for the Armenian cause. The interven-
tions of the missionaries, clergymen, scholars, journalists who constituted western Europe’s Arme-
nophile networks were not simply a sideshow. Their actions influenced the fate of the Armenians, 
by bringing them to the attention of the wider world, forging a wider public understanding of the 
‘Armenian question’ which would ultimately shape international responses to Genocide.57 
  
Genocide and the boundaries of the First World War 
There is a growing acceptance amongst historians of the Armenian Genocide that the outbreak of 
the First World War played a decisive role in determining the fate of the Ottoman Armenian popu-
lation. A generalised acknowledgement that the war provided a ‘cover’ for Genocide has been re-
placed by more in-depth analyses of the particular ways in which the early stages of the war trans-
formed the attitudes of the Young Turks and lead them to view the Armenians as an unacceptable 
threat to the Empire. The early stages of the war in the Ottoman Empire featured both sporadic vio-
lence against minorities and state-led deportations. Even the war had begun Greeks living in coastal 
regions had been subject to forced resettlement as a prophylactic measure, part of the ‘demographic 
engineering’ which followed the Balkan Wars.58 However the fate of the Armenians would be qual-
itatively different to these early measures. In late April 1915, on the eve of the Gallipoli landings, 
the targeting of Armenians evolved into a systematic process of deportation and massacre designed 
to remove the Armenian population in its entirety from the Ottoman Empire. 
 
The shift towards Genocide followed the devastating defeat of the Ottoman army by the Russians at 
Sarikamish in early 1915 and Armenian resistance in the Eastern Anatolian city of Van. These 
events generated a very real fear amongst the Young Turks that Armenian nationalists would side 
with their compatriots across the border in the Caucasus and thus pose a threat to the security of the 
already-vulnerable Empire. Bloxham has characterised these development in terms of the ‘cumula-
tive radicalization’ of the Young Turk leadership, in doing so demonstrating that the Genocide was 
a contingent and evolving process rather that the outcome of a pre-existing ‘blueprint’.59 His per-
spective may be connected to an acknowledgement across the wider field of genocide studies that 
genocidal processes frequently occur as part of a broader continuum of violence. In the words of 
Norman Naimark, ‘genocide has a dynamic of its own. It is not an ‘event’ in and of itself, but a pro-
cess … Many cases of genocide begin with programs of forced deportation or ethnic cleansing that 
evolve sometimes seamlessly into mass murder.’60 
 
Despite the growing importance accorded to the War by scholars of the Genocide, the deportation 
and massacre of the Ottoman Armenians remain peripheral to histories of the First World War, 
barely connected to the trench warfare of the Western front which dominates both the historiog-
raphy and popular conceptions of this conflict. If, as Winter has suggested, a ‘transnational turn’ is 
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underway in First World War studies, there is potential to better integrate these two histories.61 
Mark Levene has suggested that our existing ‘myopia’ regarding the war beyond the western front, 
‘most particularly in the rimland Balkans, Anatolia and Caucasus as well as the larger Eastern 
Front, can have the effect of distorting our understanding of the nature of the Great War else-
where.’62 If this is the case then better integrating the fate of the Armenians would help to redress 
the balance, and enhancing understandings of the nature and experience of the War in general. 
 
Over the last decade the work of historians has reached beyond the battlefields of north-western Eu-
rope, engaging with events on other fronts and the experiences of populations beyond Europe.63 
These developments have not always filtered through to the public sphere. A British Council report, 
Remember the World as Well as the War, prepared on the eve of the centenary, highlighted the lim-
its of public knowledge and understanding of the global dimensions of the conflict: ‘The centenary 
provides an opportunity to enhance trust and understanding between the UK and countries around 
the world. As well as remembering the events of the Western Front, it needs to include the contribu-
tions, experiences and trauma of many more countries.’64 Still, many of the flagship events com-
memorating the War’s centenary, in the UK at least, have either had a distinctly ‘national’ tone or 
reinforced the emphasis on the trench warfare of the Western Front.65 The commemorative installa-
tion ’Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’, which opened at the Tower of London in 2014 to public 
acclaim, consisted of thousands of ceramic poppies, each representing one British or colonial life 
lost in the war. Inadvertently or otherwise this reproduced the iconography of the Western Front 
and the European ‘lost generation’.66 
 
Reviews of First World War historiography prompted by the centenary have concluded that even in 
the academic sphere the ‘transnational turn’ remains partial and uneven. Alan Kramer, suggests 
that, ‘the main spotlight remains on the west European theatre and Germany while the Eastern and 
Southern theatres, not to mention the global aspects are left largely in the dark.’67 The regions in-
habited by the Armenians are still not in the spotlight. Indeed the Ottoman and Russian Empires as 
a whole have, in relative terms, been neglected in the historiography of the First World War.68 As 
Joshua Sanborn has pointed out, whilst the names of the battlefields of Western Europe are general-
ly familiar to educated Europeans and Americans, few have heard of the sites of violence and con-
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flict on the Eastern front.69 The same may be said of the Ottoman Empire, with the notable excep-
tion of the Gallipoli campaign, and this impinges on popular international understandings of the war 
largely as an exceptional, highly mythologised account of bravery and defeat for British and AN-
ZAC troops.70 This lack of knowledge of the war in these two vast continental empires is not simply 
a matter of (western) euro-centric bias. It has also been shaped by the post-war trajectories of these 
territories and the ways that they have shaped local patterns of remembrance and forgetting. For 
whilst the First World War may have led to a ‘memory boom’ in Western Europe, the same cannot 
be said of the former Ottoman and Russian Empires.71 
 
The First World War has been conspicuous by its absence from Ottoman and Turkish historiog-
raphy, overshadowed by the War of Independence and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. In 
2010 Eric Jan Zurcher suggested that ‘with the single exception of the issue of the Armenian geno-
cide it [the First World War] remains the most understudied period in twentieth century Turkish his-
tory.’72. The historiography, according the Mustafa Aksakal, has been shaped by the desire to estab-
lish a ‘clean break’ with Ottoman past.73 The First World War in the Russian Empire, has similarly 
been eclipsed by the Russian Revolution and subsequent civil wars. Karen Petrone’s research has 
demonstrated that whilst in Soviet Russia no ‘overarching, mythic narrative’ of the conflict 
emerged, limited but diverse spaces remained in which the war was remembered and losses 
mourned.74 Referring to the construction of the Genocide memorial in Yerevan in the mid-1960s, 
Petrone makes a brief but important case for  the need to look beyond Russia in order to understand 
the history and memory of the war in the Russian Empire.75 
 
Despite these circumstances, in recent years research on the War in both the Ottoman and Russian 
Empires has broadened and diversified. The perspectives which have emerged from this research, 
provide a framework for a proper contextualisation of fate of the Armenians as part of the wartime 
experience of the Ottoman/Russian borderlands. It has long been commonplace to observe that the 
fate of the Armenians was a result of their borderland position, the liminal location of their ‘home-
land’ on the edge of two competing empires. However, explanations which rely on the notion of 
borderlands as sites of endemic violence, as Peter Holquist has explained, tend to ‘reify historical 
conditions as near-permeant, quasi geological features’ or rely on ‘one dimensional explanations - 
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‘the clash of civilizations’, for instance.’76 However new research on the conduct of war in the Ot-
toman/Russian borderlands and the wider wartime practices of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 
now offers a powerful means of challenging these ‘one dimensional’ explanations and relating the 
deportation and massacre of the Armenians to regional and transnational patterns of violence and 
displacement. 
 
Most pertinent to the case of the Armenian Genocide is the literature on the targeting of civilian 
populations as part of wartime mobilisation as well as in the conduct of warfare. In the context of 
total war the boundaries between civilians and combatants became blurred. According to Alan 
Kramer, ’for all sides in the war, enemy civilians and other non-combatants came to be regarded to 
a greater or lesser degree as targets of war policy, even as legitimate objects of violence.’77 For 
many years, as Heather Jones and Laurence Van Yperserle have pointed out, the civilian experience 
was neglected in the historiography, ‘With the exception of the Belgians, the millions of civilians 
who fled the fighting or were forcibly deported from their homes, exiled, starved or slaughtered 
were largely written out of the western historical narrative of the war.’78 However the social and 
cultural histories which now dominate scholarship on the First World War have now addressed in 
some depth the civilian experience. As well as examining how populations were mobilised for war 
this research has also addressed how populations were rendered vulnerable, examining war atroci-
ties and gendered violence, internment, forced migration and the treatment of Prisoners Of War.79 
Even so, Jones and Van Yperserle note that ‘the Armenian, Greek, Slav, Turkish and Jewish civil-
ian victims of the war still seem to ‘count for less in the war’s commemorative hierarchy than the 
soldiery of Western Europe.’80  
 
The social and cultural history of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, is not well deve-
loped although emerging scholarship in the field is beginning to change this.81 Research on the Rus-
sian Empire has however provided insights which help to situate the fate of the Armenians in 
broader patterns of wartime violence and displacement. The work of Peter Gatrell and Eric Lohr has 
demonstrated that violence against civilians was not simply perpetrated by invading forces or a 
product of the ‘chaos’ of war. Rather, anxieties over the security of  border regions, and a preoccu-
pation with the loyalty or otherwise of border populations rendered minority populations the targets 
of state or military directed deportations and expropriations in the Russian as well as the Ottoman 
Empire.82 Whilst these techniques were not inherently violent, they frequently descended into at-
tacks on civilians. Peter Holquist’s analysis of Russian occupation and violence in the Caucasus and 
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in Galicia meanwhile demonstrates how violence against civilian populations was not necessarily 
‘purposeful’ or pre-ordained but highly contingent, with a dynamic of its own. In drawing out the 
factors which limited Russian violence in the region and showing why, unlike the Ottomans, Russia 
did not not ultimately espouse a policy of mass expulsions Holquist reminds us of the dangers of 
making generalisations regarding inevitable wartime ‘radicalisation’ and leads us to consider why 
the factors which tempered radical acts of violence and deportation in other empires were absent in 
the Ottoman case.83 
 
In Great Catastrophe Thomas De Waal’s argues that the story [of the Armenian Genocide], ‘comes 
out differently depending on whether you regard the events in the Caucasus and in Eastern Anatolia 
as being closely related or two separate zones of conflict’.84 It is frequently assumed that the experi-
ences of Armenians in the Ottoman and Russian Empires during the First World War and the Geno-
cide were entirely distinct, with the Russian Armenians escaping much of the suffering experienced 
by their counterparts in the Ottoman territories.85 Whilst it is certainly true that it was the Ottoman 
Armenians who experienced at first hand deportation and mass killing, to imagine the wartime ex-
periences of the two regions as distinct is problematic. Connecting histories of the experience of 
War in the Ottoman and Russian Empires has generated important insights. For example, in their 
comparative study of expropriations Üngör and Lohr demonstrate how in both the Russian and Ot-
toman cases ‘maintaining and increasing power of upward social mobility shaped the patterns of 
recruitment for and participation in violence’, whilst at the same time drawing out the particularities 
which meant that the Armenian case escalated towards genocide.86 Michael Reynolds’ Shattering 
Empires, has meanwhile demonstrated that in wartime borders between the two ‘zones’ inhabited 
by Armenians - Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus - were porous and shifting, characterised by 
cross border movements of civilian populations, patterns of violence and claims on territory and 
resources. 
 
Broadening the geographical scope to encompass the Caucasus creates a more complex picture of 
the Genocide and its consequences, not least because civilians of all ethnic backgrounds in these 
regions became the target of state and military led deportations in this region. Sporadic acts of vio-
lence and atrocity were perpetrated by civilians and combatants alike. Muslims in the provinces of 
Kars and Batumi were deported as the Russians advanced.87 Armenians also committed acts of vio-
lence, including attacks by Armenian militias on the Muslim populations of Artvin and the 
Chorokhi Valley.88 Further violence against the Muslim inhabitants of the South Caucasus (at the 
time usually referred to as ‘Tatars’) unfolded following the Mudros armistice and the establishment 
of the First Armenian Republic. These episodes of violence do not fit easily with the historiograph-
ical narratives predicated on a clear dividing line between perpetrators and victims which have 
emerged in the context of denial. However, if the complex, cyclical patterns of inter-ethnic violence 
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that war and genocide generated in this region, are to be fully understood, there is a need for further 
empirical research.89  
 
Whilst it is clear to see how Ottoman and Russian aims and actions during the war shaped the fate 
of the Armenians, making connections between the Genocide and the ostensibly very different con-
text of the war in Europe has proved more difficult. The concept of ‘war cultures’ (in the words of 
Jay Winter, ‘the discursive forms through which contemporaries understood the world at war in 
which they were living’) provides one way of doing so. It provides a framework for understanding 
how populations could be mobilised for war and how individuals made sense of their experiences.90 
More importantly for this case, it also offers a way of thinking about how wartime populations con-
ceived of their enemies and made sense of violence. Something akin to this focus on ‘war cultures’ 
appears to be emerging in recent scholarship on the Armenian Genocide. Suny’s emphasis on the 
‘affective disposition’ of the Young Turks is suggestive of a new critical concern with the men-
talitites and cultures that shaped the ways Armenians were constructed as an enemy ‘other’ as well 
as the social, political and economic realities which lead to genocide.91 Similarly, the analysis of the 
memoirs of individuals who witnessed or were perpetrators of violence against the Armenians in 
Göçek’s Denial of Violence captures the ways that a pre-war culture of fear, resentment and eventu-
al hatred of the Armenians, in the context of wartime crisis, made the Armenians appear the legiti-
mate targets of genocidal processes.  
 
Examining to what extent the attitudes which shaped violence against the Ottoman Armenians can 
be connected to a broader European ‘war culture’ would demand further research on the Ottoman 
case. Alan Kramer’s Dynamic of Destruction which traces a transnational process of radicalisation 
which fostered cultural destruction and mass killing during the First World War begins to make 
connections between the Armenian Genocide and atrocities, mass violence and cultural destruction 
in Eastern and Western Europe. Contemporary observers certainly understood the treatment of the 
Armenians as an extreme within a larger category of ‘war atrocities’ which transgressed the norms 
of civilised warfare.92 Thus German atrocities in Belgium, the destruction of the Cathedral at Lou-
vain and the mass-killing of Armenians could be interpreted as points on a spectrum of destructive, 
transgressive violence. Kramer argues that in the First World War, ‘the enemy was not merely the 
enemy army, but the enemy nation and the culture through which it defined itself.’93 This desire to 
destroy an entire culture was certainly evident in the Armenian Genocide which encompassed not 
just the removal of the Armenian population the attempt to destroy all traces of their existence. Not 
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only was Armenian property expropriated but cultural heritage, especially religious architecture, 
was destroyed across the Empire.94  
 
Yet the scope and intent of the Ottoman treatment of the Armenians differentiates it from other acts 
of violence against civilians. The ‘culture of destruction’ did not result in genocide in any other re-
gions during the First World War and understanding why this was the case is as important as identi-
fying transnational patterns and structural similarities. Kramer tentatively suggests that it was a 
combination of internal instability, the vulnerability of the Young Turks, external threat and the 
presence of ethnic minorities that differentiated the Ottoman Empire from other wartime states, but 
a more in-depth consideration of the Ottoman case is necessary if this line of enquiry is to be pur-
sued.95 Situating the Armenians within this framework of wartime radicalisation which normalised 
violence against civilians without reverting to overly-deterministic arguments about modern war-
fare, brutalisation or the First World War as the origin of ‘industrial killing’ is not straightforward. 
As Kramer points out, the relationship between total war and genocide is complex: ‘total war, 
which tends towards annihilation, bears within it the potential for genocide. Yet genocide was not 
an inevitable consequence of total war, nor, as we now know from the experience of Rwanda in the 
1990s was total war even a necessary precondition for genocide.’96 
 
New Boundaries, New Voices, New Directions 
As the centenary of the Armenian Genocide is commemorated it becoming is clear that the national 
narratives that have long dominated histories of the Armenian Genocide are, at least in part, giving 
way to a more complex picture of the conflict and coexistence of Armenians and Turks at the end of 
the Ottoman Empire. This is in part due to insights uncovered through new archival research. It is 
equally a product of the increased engagement of scholars in the field with both wider histori-
ographies and a greater variety of methodologies and theoretical perspectives. These developments 
are, gradually, producing the kind of ‘interactive’ histories, ‘framed within the larger context of 
world/global history’ that Aslanian calls for.97 Developments in academic scholarship cannot be 
separated from those in the public sphere. Some of the most innovative scholarship of recent years 
has been produced by scholars for whom the writing of history has gone hand in hand with cross-
border activism, advocacy and dialogue. 
 
Through quite separate developments the fate of the Armenians has increasingly come to the atten-
tion of historians of genocide, of displacement and diasporas, the modern Middle East, and of the 
First World War. In the case of the First World War this is part of the gradual stretching of the im-
agined chronological and geographical boundaries of the conflict over the last decade or more. 
However, simply adding geographical ‘case studies’ - the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire 
- to existing histories is not in itself enough. As Jay Winter reminds us, ‘transnational history does 
not start with one state and move on to others, but takes multiple levels of historical experience as 
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given, levels which are both below and above the national level.’98 There is still a need for further 
research which addresses experiences of war in this region, from ‘below’ the national level, from 
both civilian and combatant perspectives. In the case of the Armenian Genocide the question of his-
tory ‘from below’ remains difficult. ‘Hearing’ the voices of the displaced is rarely straightforward, 
but he context of denial means that there are particular challenges in the interpretation of survivor 
testimonies.99 Nonetheless, a growth of ethnographic and oral history research, especially amongst 
post-genocide communities in Turkey promises to generate new insights, in particular by re-framing 
Armenians as individuals and historical actors rather than simply as undifferentiated passive vic-
tims. 
 
‘War cultures’ may have generated immense destruction but they also encompassed visions of re-
construction; just as they shaped images of the enemy and legitimated violence, they also defined 
victims, allies and populations that were deserving of concern, care or material aid. The Ottoman 
treatment of the Armenians had highly visible transnational consequences. Until at least the mid-
1920s thousands were caught in cycles of displacement, moving between the ports of the eastern 
Mediterranean, the mandate states of the Middle East and the Soviet Republic of Armenia.100 The 
fate of these refugees and subsequent attempts to reconstruct the nation through the care of orphans, 
rescue of women and rehabilitation of refugees are a focus of emerging research.101 The interna-
tional response to the Armenian refugee crisis has been identified as a defining moment in the 
growing field of humanitarian history, but these histories are also very much a part of the social and 
cultural history of the First World War.102 Displacement was central to the experience of war for 
Armenians, as it was for populations in the Balkans, the Russian Empire and beyond. For civilians 
meanwhile, the image of Armenian suffering and the provision of aid to ‘starving Armenians’ was a 
way of making meaning from the conflict. For hundreds of others the defining experience of the 
war was providing material relief or medical care on the ground’ in the Middle East or the Cauca-
sus. 
 
Thus the kinds of transnational perspective that Winter refers to are developing in new research 
which makes connections between the ‘war cultures’ of the Ottoman and Russian Empires and 
Western European nations, identifies transnational trends in the treatment of minorities. It is equally 
evident in research which traces the experience of populations displaced across national boundaries 
and those that came to their aid. These perspectives help to situate the Armenian Genocide within 
the context of wartime targeting of civilians on a global scale. They suggest that the Genocide 
should not be treated as a deviation from ‘ordinary’ forms of wartime violence. Indeed Heather 
Jones has suggested that by engaging with the fate of the Armenians historians have begun to de-
velop ‘new understandings of the true scale and innovative nature of war violence against civil-
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ians’.103 Thus neglect the fate of the Armenians and its aftermaths may be to misunderstand the na-
ture of the war itself. 
 
In April 2015 Armenians were able to commemorate the centenary of the Genocide in Istanbul, in 
conjunction with local Turkish as well as Armenian activists and academics, as well as in Yerevan. 
Yet challenges to writing a more integrated and nuanced history of Armenians and Turks at the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire remain. Meline Toumani’s recent memoir, for example, provided a telling 
account of the continued power of national narratives, ‘A century after those events, Armenians and 
Turks - in Turkey, in Armenia, and especially in the widespread diasporas of both countries - be-
lieve in two radically different accounts of what happened. ‘Believe.’ It is not a matter of faith, yet 
it might as well be for the power that these clashing narratives hold.’104 Furthermore, as Kasbarian 
and Öktem have described, ‘taboo breaking academic conferences … civil society encounters and 
commemorative events’ are still ‘overshadowed by deep-seated prejudice, security and fear of the 
Other, as well as by an overbearing Turkish nation-state.’105  
 
In January 2007 the Turkish-Armenian journalist and activist Hrant Dink was assassinated in Istan-
bul. His funeral prompted thousands to march through the city bearing placards proclaiming ‘We 
are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenian.’ These events simultaneously demonstrated the progress 
that had been made in and the enormous distance left to travel. A further reminder of just how con-
tested this history remains in Turkey came with the approach of the centenary commemorations. 
This year the Turkish authorities announced that the commemorations of the Gallipoli landings, 
which would be attended by a range of world leaders, would be held on the 24th of April rather than 
the 25th, the date on which the anniversary is usually marked.106 This was widely interpreted as an 
attempt to distract international attention from the commemoration of the centenary of the Geno-
cide, on the 24th April. 
 
This ‘competitive’ commemoration was of course a product of the particularities of Turk-
ish/Armenian relations and the policies of the current Turkish government. It also reflects a problem 
of centenary-driven history more broadly. Commemorations have a tendency to mythologise and 
romanticise. They can smooth over contested pasts in order to construct national identities and 
sometimes to promote nationalist or political agendas. They can create hierarchies of suffering, 
where some the victims of some acts of violence are invested with deep symbolic value and others 
are neglected. The Turkish choices about the Gallipoli commemorations are a particularly telling 
example of how anniversary-driven histories frequently reinforce national and sometimes exclu-
sionary narratives, generating fragmented rather than interconnected understandings of the past. 
How to broaden the picture, to illustrate the connections between the global, the national and the 
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local - ‘Remembering the World as well as the War’ - without succumbing to charges of ‘tokenism’ 
remains a challenge, both for academics and  those addressing wider public audiences. 
 
Scholarly analyses of the Genocide have now moved beyond a quest for proof that the term is ap-
plicable to the Armenian case. Donald Bloxham and Hans-Lucas Kieser have emphasised that, 
‘genocide’ is a social scientific as well as a legal term.107 It is this, the concept’s explanatory func-
tion which has gradually come to be most important for scholars of the Armenian case. Nonethe-
less, the symbolic value of the concept in particular Armenian communities is still worthy of further 
consideration. One hundred years after 1915 what does recognition of the Genocide really mean? Is 
international legal recognition, an apology from Turkey or the reconciliation of individuals and 
communities more important? For those approaching Armenian history from the outside, it often 
appears that the question of Genocide dominates the Armenian diaspora. In Great Catastrophe 
Thomas De Waal states that Genocide is ‘not an organising principle of identity for citizens in the 
Republic of Armenia’.108 This is an important reminder that the Genocide and its recognition is not 
the sum total of the Armenian  experience past or present. Writing histories of Armenians and Turks 
which acknowledge both the causes of conflict and the possibilities of coexistence, while acknowl-
edging that identities and experiences cannot always be neatly contained within clear boundaries or 





                                                 
107
 Bloxham and Kieser, ‘Genocide,’, 586. 
108
 De Waal, Great Catastrophe, 3. 
   20 
References 
Akçam, Taner, The Young Turk’s Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic 
Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. 
Aksakal, Mustafa. The Ottoman Road to War in 1914. Cambridge: CUP, 2008. 
Anderson, Margaret Lavinia Michael Reynolds, Hans Lukas Kieser, Peter Balakian, Dirk  
Moses, Taner Akçam. ‘Review Forum’.  Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 4 (2013): 463-509. 
Anderson, Margaret Lavinia. ‘A responsibility to protest? The public, the Powers and the Armeni-
ans in the era of Abdülhamit II’. Journal of Genocide Research 17, no. 3 (2015): 259-283. 
Aslanian, Sebouh. ‘The Treason of the Intellectuals: Reflections on the Uses of Revisionism and 
Nationalism in Armenian Historiography’. Armenian Forum 2, no. 4 (2002): 1-38. 
Aslanian, Sebouh. ‘The Marble of Armenian History or Armenian History as World history’. 
Études arméniennes contemporaines  4 (2014): 129-142. 
Bauman, Zygmunt .Modernity and the Holocaust. Oxford: OUP, 1989. 
Bayley, C. A., Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyer, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia 
Seed. ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’. American Historical Review 111, no. 5 
(2006): 1441-1464. 
Bloxham,  Donald. ‘The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalisation and the 
Development of a Destruction Policy’. Past and Present 181, no. 1 (2003): 141 - 192. 
Bloxham, Donald. Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the 
Ottoman Armenians. Oxford: OUP, 2005. 
Bloxham  Donald and Dirk Moses.’Introduction: Changing Themes in Genocide Studies’. In The 
Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, edited by Donald Bloxham and Dirk Moses. Oxford: OUP, 
2010. 
Bloxham, Donald and Hans Lukas Kieser. ‘Genocide’. In The Cambridge History of the First 
World War Vol. 3, edited by Jay M. Winter. Cambridge: CUP, 2014. 
Bostanci, Anne and John Dubber. Remember the World as Well as the War. British Council, 2014. 
Cabanes, Bruno, The Great War and the Origins of Modern Humanitarianism 1918-24. Cambridge, 
CUP, 2014. 
Çetin Fethiye . My Grandmother:A Memoir. London: Verso, 2008. 
Chahinian. ‘The Paris Attempt’. Ph.D. Diss. UCLA, 2009, 
Chatty, Dawn Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East. Cambridge: CUP, 
2010. 
Cheterian, Vicken. Open Wounds: Armenians, Turks and a Century of Genocide. London: Hurst, 
2015. 
Clavin, Patricia. ‘Time, Manner, Place: Writing Modern European History in Global. Transnational 
and International Contexts’. European History Quarterly 40, no. 4 (2010): 624-640. 
Cohen, Aaron J. ‘ Our Russian Passport: First World War Monuments, Transnational Commemora-
tion and the Russian Emigration in Europe, 1918-1939’.  Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 
4 (2014), 627-51. 
Dadrian, Vahakn. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to the 
Caucasus. Oxford, Berghann, 1995. 
De Waal, Thomas. Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide. Oxford: 
OUP, 2015. 
   21 
Der Matossian Bedross. Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Ottoman 
Empire Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2014. 
Dündar. Fuat. Crime of Numbers, The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question 1878–1918. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010. 
Ekmekcioglu, Lerna. ‘A Climate for Abduction, A Climate for Redemption: The Politics of Inclu-
sion during and after the Armenian Genocide’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 55, no. 
3 (2013): 522-553. 
Gatrell, Peter. A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2000. 
Gatrell, Peter. The Making of the Modern Refugee. Oxford: OUP, 2013. 
Gerwarth, Robert and Erez Manela, Empires at War 1911-23. Oxford, OUP, 2014. 
Gerwarth, Robert and Erez Manela. ’The Great War as Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Re-
configuration of the World Order 1911-1923’. Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 785-800. 
Göçek, Fatma Müge. ‘Reading Genocide: Turkish Historiography on 1915’. In  A Question of Gen-
ocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire,  edited by Norman Naimark, Fatma 
Müge Göçek and Ronald Grigor Suny. Oxford: OUP, 2012. 
Göçek, Fatma Müge. Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence 
against the Armenians, 1789-2009. Oxford: OUP, 2014.  
Holquist, Peter. ‘Forms of Violence during the Russian Occupation of Ottoman Territory and in 
Northern Persia (Urmia and Astrabad) October 1914 - December 1917’. In Shatterzone of Empires: 
Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands, edited by 
Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. 
Holquist, Peter. ’The Role of Personality in the First (1914-1915) Russian Occupation of Galicia 
and Bukovina’. In Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in European History, edited by 
John Klier. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. 
Hoquist, Peter. ‘The Politics and Practice of the Russian Occupation of Armenia 1915-February 
1917’. In A Question of Genocide, edited by Norman Naimark, Fatma Müge Göçek and Ronald 
Grigor Suny. Oxford: OUP, 2012. 
Horne, John and Alan Kramer. German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002. 
Horne, John. ed. A Companion to World War I. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2010. 
Horne, John.’The Great War at its Centenary’. in The Cambridge History of the First World War 
Vol. 3, edited by Jay M. Winter. Cambridge: CUP, 2014. 
Hovanissian, Richard The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire’. In The Armenian People 
from Ancient to Modern Times: Vol II Foreign Dominion to Statehood, edited by Richard 
Hovannisian.  York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
Jones, Heather. Violence Against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and 
Germany, 1914-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Jones, Heather. ‘Historiographical Review: As the Centenary Approaches: The Regeneration of 
First World War Historiography’. The Historical Journal 56, no. 3 (2013): 857-78. 
Jones, Heather and Laurence Van Yperserle ‘Introduction: Populations at Risk’. In The Cambridge 
History of the First World War Vol. 3, edited by Jay M. Winter. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014. 
Kaligian, Dikran. Armenian Organisation and Ideology Under Turkish Rule. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Press, 2009. 
Kevorkian, Raymond. The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011. 
   22 
Gellately, Robert and Ben Kiernan, eds. The Spectre of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Per-
spective. Cambridge: CUP , 2003. 
Kieser, Hans Lukas and Dominik J. Schaller, eds. Der Volkermord an den Armeniern und die Sho-
ah. Zurich: Chronos, 2002. 
Kramer,  Alan. Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War. Oxford: 
OUP, 2007. 
Klein, Janet. The Margins of Empire:Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone. Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2011. 
Kramer, Alan. ‘Recent Historiography of the First World War (I)’. Journal of Modern European 
History 12, no. 1 (2014): 5-27 
Laycock, Jo. Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity and Intervention. Manchester, 
MUP,2009. 
Lehman, Maike. ‘Apricot Socialism: The National Past, the Soviet Project and the Imagining of 
Community in late Soviet Armenia’.  Slavic Review 74, no. 1 (2015): 9-31. 
Lessersohn. Nora.’“Provincial Cosmopolitanism” in Late Ottoman Anatolia: An Armenian Shoe-
maker's Memoir’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 57, no 2. (2015): 528-556. 
Levene, Mark. The Crisis of Genocide Vol. 1. Devastation: The European Rimlands 1912-1938. 
Oxford: OUP, 2013. 
Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Oxford: OUP, 1968. 
Little, Brandon, ed. ‘Special Issue: Humanitarianism in the Era of the First World War’. Journal of 
First World War Studies 5, no.1 (2014). 
Lohr, Eric. Nationalising the Russian Empire: The Campaign Against Enemy Aliens During WWI. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard, 2003.  
Marutyan, Hatutyun. Iconography of Armenian Identity: The Memory of Genocide and the 
Karabakh Movement. Yerevan: Gitutyin, 2009). 
Mandel, Maud, In the Aftermath of Genocide: Armenians and Jews in Twentieth Century France 
Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2003. 
Kilborne Matossian, Mary The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia. Leiden: Brill, 1962.  
McLeod, Jenny. Gallipoli. Oxford: OUP, 2015. 
Melson, Robert. Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Hol-
ocaust. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Migliorino, Nicola. (Re)Constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-Cultural Diversity and 
the State in the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis. Oxford: Berghann, 2008. 
Miller Donald E. and Lorna Touryan Miller. Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
Naguib, Nefissa.’Storytelling: Armenian Family Albums in the Diaspora’. Visual Anthropology 21, 
no. 3 (2008): 231-244. 
Naimark, Norman Fires of Hatred:Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
Nichanian, Marc, The Historiographic Perversion. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 
Öktem, Kerem. Angry Nation: Turkey Since 1989. London: Zed books, 2011. 
Öktem, Kerem and Sossie Kasbarian. ’Subversive friendships: Turkish and Armenian Encounters in 
Transnational Space’. Patterns of Prejudice 48, no. 2 (2014): 121 - 146. 
Panossian, Razmik. The Armenians:From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars. Lon-
don: Hurst, 2007. 
   23 
Petrone, Karen. The Great War in Russian Memory. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011. 
Reynolds,  Michael. Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Em-
pires 1908-1918. Cambridge: CUP, 2013. 
Robertson, Geoffrey. An Inconvenient Genocide: Who now Remembers the Armenians. London: 
Biteback, 2014. 
Rodogno, Davide. Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–
1914: The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 2012. 
Sanborn, Joshua, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire. 
Oxford: OUP, 2014. 
Stibbe, Matthew. ed. Captivity, Forced Labour and Forced Migration in Europe During the First 
World War. London: Routledge, 2009. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. ‘Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Armenians’. 
American Historical Review 114, no. 4 (2009): 930-946. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. They can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian 
Genocide. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. 
Tanielian, Melanie. ‘The Politics of Wartime Relief in Ottoman Beirut 1914-18’.  First World War 
Studies 5, no. 1 (2014): 69-82. 
Ternon, Yves. Les Armeniens: Histoire d’un Genocide. Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1977. 
Toumani, Meline, There as and there was not. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014. 
Tusan, Michelle. Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle East. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2012. 
Svazlian, Verjine. The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survivors. Yerevan: Gi-
toutyun, 2011. 
Üngör, Uğur Ümit. The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia 1913-
1950. Oxford: OUP, 2011. 
Üngör, Uğur Ümit. ‘Orphans, Converts,and Prostitutes: Social Consequences of War and Persecu-
tion in the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1923’. War in History 19, no. 2 (2012): 173-192. 
Üngör, Ugur Umit. ‘Turkey for the Turks: Demographic engineering in Eastern Anatolia, 1914 -
1945,’ in A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire,  edited 
by Norman Naimark, Fatma Müge Göçek and Ronald Grigor Suny. Oxford: OUP, 2012. 
Üngör, Uğur Ümit and Mehmet Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction. The Young Turk Seizure of 
Armenian Property. London: Continuum, 2013. 
Üngör Ugur Umit and Eric Lohr. ’Economic Nationalism, Confiscation and Genocide: A Compari-
son of the Ottoman and Russian Empires during WWI’. Journal of Modern European History 12, 
no. 4 (2014): 500-522. 
Weiner Amir. ed. Landscaping the Human Garden. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
Weitz, Eric, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003. 
Winter, Jay M. ‘Under cover of war: the Armenian Genocide in the context of total war’. In Ameri-
ca and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 edited by Jay M. Winter. Cambridge: CUP, 2004.  
Winter, Jay M. and Antoine Prost. The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies 1914 to 
the Present.Cambridge: CUP, 2005. 
   24 
Winter, Jay M. Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth 
Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, 
Winter, Jay M. ‘General Introduction.’ In Cambridge History of the First World War Vol. 1, edited 
by Jay M. Winter. Cambridge: CUP, 2014. 
Yosmaoğlu, İpek. Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Mace-
donia 1878-1908. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
Zürcher, Erik Jan. The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building. London: IB Tauris, 2010. 
